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ri\i THE SIPKTCNB: mum mu i\w: 
STATE OF iFTAH 
WANDA MAUREEN PETERSONf : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
Case No. 20023 
vs. 
mcgNSL Lm PEEERSCN, . 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
•i vi ] proceeding involving the modification or a Jivorce 
decree. 
DISPOSITION OF THh i^h L<* I'MB uumk JOUKT 
Subsequent ro tr*p entry of a Decree of Divorce in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of utan Count*/, defendant initiated an Order to 
Shew Cause hea * 
plaintiff pay a portion y uxe fair rental 'n of the ham of the 
parties to the defendant,, The tri a] court fot ind there had been a m ater-
iaJ change ii: 1 tl le circumstances of the 'parties and ordered the decree 
modified to require 'the plaintiff to 'pay $70,00 per month to the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks the affirmati on of the decision of the trial Oonr* 
FACTS 
rht ,3 . im ill Ii ii i'din* I  MI I o n 1 hfj» t i f u l m u i i II|NUI le t e n d a n f l Mulu>n to 
Modify the '.Decree of Divorce, entered 'the 29th day of Ju ly , 19ft . J*<*e 
defendant had previously sought to modify Hie I^TM-PP at .i In 
1 
March 31, 1983. At that time the Court declined to modify the decree to 
provide for the payment of any amount as defendant's portion of the fair 
rental value of the residence until sold as requested by defendant. Hew-
ever, in making his decision, Judge Sam indicated that at the time the 
second mortgage on the heme was retired, the Court would be inclined to 
order the payment of the sum of $70.00 per month from the plaintiff to 
the defendant based upon changes in the financial and marital status of 
the parties. At page 41 of the transcript of that proceeding, the Court 
stated: 
THE COURT: Let me tell you on that home it appears to me that 
the fair rental value as stated is $300.00, she is paying $300.00. I 
may, in August $140.00 there on the second mortgage, I may counsel order 
$70.00 per month rent payment in August. 
MR. PETERSEN: Your Honor that would be premature to speculate 
what to do in August. We have to look at the situation as it exists 
right now. 
THE COURT: That is what I am doing. 
MR. PETERSEN: I don't want to make any order. 
THE COURT: Let me say I have heard the testimony that the second 
mortgage will be paid off in August. I have heard testimony that the fair 
rental value of the heme is $300.00 a month. She is presently paying 
$300.00 a month and in ny judgment there is no requirement to make any 
payment to Mr. Petersen based upon the present testimony, but when that 
second mortgage is paid it would appear to me that it would be fair and 
reasonable since Mr. or Mrs. Jensen is married and her husband is occupying 
that home, that $70.00 per month may be fair rental value. 
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MR. PETERSEN: Well, I hope the court is not entering an order to 
do that at this time because we must look at the situation now. The fact 
thut ) roti arm ponnlizinn hor tr r romirryirM IIP i.. :,.- arried, shi1 bah th 
heme. 
THE COURT: 1 understand counsel and 1 -an t ry ing—lis ten , these 
divorce matters a ie I lit' inusl diff icult , matte L s I hat t h i s court handles i >£ 
a l l cases and I am trying my best to make i fa i r and equi table order . If 
they are not fa i r and equi table , pmu have the Five iudqes u|i ¥1 Mm hi 1 1 
to review my order, I mi s t a t ing UkiL at t:he present I t does not appeal 
there may be a bas is to have him, since the new husband i s occupying t ha t 
} .ill inn 1 H ¥ i I ' M i F 1 1 Hi1 I 1 I I I 1 1 l i t i l1 il« , ' i 1 1 In I n 1  I * 11 ,i 1 H i l i l l I I t 
payment, Now1 if you want to come back in and r e l i t i g a t e that in August, 
you have that' r i gh t , but T -w t e l l i n g you what my observation i s at the 
present based m iiul 1 liaVn heard. 
The defendant brought h i s Motion to Modity |a t ter the second mort-
submitter .v - xhit . 4 . die t ran • .ut. *t the March J i , LS>8J proceedings. 
The cour t found tha t there had been a mater ia l chartge of circumstances of 
the par t i e s u< it enni eiiiplatBi I -it: th i„e 1 IIIW , h 1,1 if -hi i p u i a t i o n • :::)f the pa r t i es 
upon which the decree 'was 'based, in 'the remarriage of the p l a i n t i f f and,, "the 
r e t i r i n g of the second mortgage on, the hone reducing" her monthly ob l iga t ion . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
j g g
 w m R Qouprpii- I JRCJHI IN I'm in M'HirPY "fHI'I IWTW. I F lirVHHtM 
WS JUSTIFIED, 
Utah 1 odf" \ i i n o t a l e d , •K)- I'": | III) | J tovideui 
3 
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may make such 
orders in relation to the children, property and parties, 
and the maintenance of the parties and childrenf as may be 
equitable. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction 
to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect 
to the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of the children and their support and maintenancef or the 
distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and 
necessary. Visitation right of parents, grandparents and 
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare 
of the child. (Emphasis added) 
It is clear that the trial court has the statutory authority under 
the provisions of the above-cited statute to make subsequent changes or 
modifications in the property division where the court deems such a modifi-
cation to be reasonable and necessary. Appellant cites several cases to 
establish the proposition that in cases of interests in real property, 
there is a greater showing of change of circumstances to justify a modifi-
cation of the decree in reference to said property. Appellant relies upon 
this court1s decision in Foulger vs. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (1981) 
stating Foulger to be "very much similar" to the present case. In 
fact, Foulger is very different from the facts of the present case. In 
the Foulger case, the lower court modified the parties equity interest 
in real property. In the present case, the modification made by the 
trial court did not alter the parties1 respective equity in the real pro-
perty. The modification in the present case is more similar to modifi-
cation of a support matter rather than that of a property right. The 
court did not give the respondent any interest in the real property divided 
by the decree, but did order payment to the respondent based upon his 
previously awarded interest in the property. This is apparent from reading 
Judge Sam's reasoning from the transcript of the March 31, 1983 hearing. 
The $70.00 figure is based upon the fifty percent equity interest of the 
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Fun. > i*- only circumstances set forth by the respondent in 
taxt*^
 ( nprovements . **. *r*ui. -snt had changed her mind dtout i^avmc 
the United States to nos^ to Germany "• ^ *~ne nrespnt ^«*P« * "<- "^i^ rr T ^ ie 
of thp *-n*a i * •• v*- - < . . J - 3e**iO 
resulting in a reduction of appellant's monthly expense for the use of the 
hone until soltl, r*institute material chanqes of circumsfaiicps whirli nisi i I'v 
\ t'M n 1 ' lOtii i I I lit- ;» IUJ 1 i n M I L u i i i a t \ m 
The facts of the present case are more akin to those found in 
of an order for a monthly mortgage payment. This cpurt stated at 'page 1300: 
Land vs. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 (1980), held that 
perty settlements are entitled to a greater sanctity 
than alimony and support payments in proceedings to modify 
divorce decrees. However, property settlements are not 
sacrosanct and are not beyond the power of a court of 
equity to modify. In this case we are not dealing with 
pursuant to a 
the payment of 
the typical distribution of specific assets] 
property settlement, but with an order for 
a monthly mortgage obligation. Clearly it Was within the 
power of the trial court to modify or eliminate the 
'obligation to make those payments if the obviously changed 
circumstances under traditional equity standards so required, 
1- ;,«- >JM n Chandler distinguished Land vs. Land 
(also cited nv appellant ^ appellant's bri ef) from'the circumstance if 
tr>a *...- ^ -iv. Lsni lh»; Iistinquished tram the type- ot 
m^Ification 'made by the trial court: in the present case. 
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POINT II 
TEE JUDCMNT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE UPHELD UNLESS 
THERE IS A SHOWING OF AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The determination of the trial court in finding a change of cir-
cumstances sufficient to require modification of a decree is granted sub-
stantial validity by this courtf absent a clear showing or error or abuse 
of discretion by the lower court. In Mitchell vs. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 
1359, at 1361, the court stated: 
"The determination of the trial court that there has been 
a substantial change of circumstances, which justified 
the increase of support and maintenance, is presumed valid. 
This position was also stated in Christiansen vs. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 
592 (1983) wherein the court stated at page 594: 
"In our review of divorce and child support proceedings, 
this Court accords substantial deference to the trial 
court's findings of fact, and accords it considerable 
latitude in fashioning appropriate relief. 
In the present case, the findings of the lower court set forth the 
decision of the court stated specific changes which the court determined to 
be material changes justifying the modification made. Those findings 
should be presumed valid as the appellant had not demonstrated the findings 
to be an abuse of discretion by the lower court. The modification made by 
the lower court is consistent with the ownership and equity interest of 
the parties in the real property and the lower court should also be given 
latitude in that area to equitably adjust the interests of the parties to 
reflect the circumstances which presently exist. See LeBreton vs. 
LeBreton, 604 P.2d 469. 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court to modify the Decree of Divorce in 
the manner and fashion done in the present case wap well within the 
authority granted the court under the provisions ofc the statutes of the 
State of Utah governing powers of the court to retkin jurisdiction to 
modify property distribution and support matters ajs well as being within 
the restrictions of the case law relevant in this fatter. 
Further, the record of the proceedings demonstrates the court 
acted within its discretion and its findings should be given deference 
and be considered valid. The decision to modify the decree in the 
manner in which the court did was within the latitude which the trial 
court should be afforded in its attempts to adjust the equities of divorce 
matters. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^ ( T ^ d a y of October, 1984. 
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